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Abstract: This paper aims to examine the impact of corporate financialization on economic value added 
(EVA). The panel regression model and threshold effect model are used based on data from 913 Chinese 
A-share listed companies between 2007 and 2016. The results show that the proportion of financial 
channel profit has a significant negative effect on EVA. Furthermore, the moderate range in the impact 
of the corporate financialization level on EVA is also captured. Besides, the impact of corporate 
financialization on EVA is heterogeneous among industries with intensity factor differences. The results 
of this study are very relevant to investors and managers. For instance, corporate financial management 
can be adjusted and supervised according to the moderate range and direction. The government should 
combine industry characteristics to create different support policies. 
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1. Introduction  
EVA (economic value added) plays a crucial role in corporate sustainable development, and the 
impact of corporate financialization on EVA is very complicated, and previous literature has not reached 
a consensus on the direction of the impact. One view is that holding financial assets or making a profit 
through financial channels would have a positive impact on promoting corporate long-term development 
(Smith & Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1996; Han & Qiu, 2007; Brown & Petersen, 2011). The “reservoir” theory 
points out that the purpose of holding financial assets is to prevent the capital disruption caused by cash 
flow shocks adversely affecting business operations (Kliman & Williams, 2015; Hu et al., 2017). The 
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liquidity of financial assets is stronger than that of fixed assets. When corporates encounter financial 
difficulties, they can sell financial assets to obtain liquidity in time, thereby alleviating the capital 
pressure (Ding, 2013; Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2015; Dai et al., 2018). Participating in financial 
investment activities can alleviate the financing constraints faced by corporates and help promote 
corporates’ R&D and innovation activities (Almeida et al., 2004; Brown & Petersen, 2011; Liu, 2017), 
thereby helping to upgrade the physical industry. Investing the remaining funds into financial markets 
with high returns can optimize the resource allocation of corporates (Corpatauxet et al., 2009). It can also 
improve investment efficiency and promote the rapid development of modern entity corporates. Another 
view is that financialization hurts corporate long-term development. The crowding-out effect believes 
that the purpose of corporate financialization is to maximize profits. When the rate of return on financial 
investment is higher than the real economy, corporates will replace financial asset investment in real 
economic investment (Orhangazi, 2008; Demir, 2009). Some contributors emphasized that high returns 
in the financial market will induce corporate managers to prefer financial activities to real industries 
when making investment decisions (Seo et al., 2012; Shin, 2012; Akkemik & Özen, 2013), This will lead 
to insufficient investment in business operations, which is not conducive to corporate long-term 
sustainable development. To pursuit excess returns on financial investment, corporations will 
significantly reduce the investment in R&D and innovation and other operational activities, and problems 
such as capital mismatch and investment efficiency decline will occur. Financialization will change 
corporate investment preference and management mode, causing companies to lose their enthusiasm for 
operating activities such as opening markets, improving product quality, strengthening technology 
research and development, and improving operating management systems. It inhibits the production 
efficiency of operational businesses (Tori & Onaran, 2017) and ultimately restricts the improvement of 
corporate value and competitiveness. 
Corporate financialization has dual preventive and alternative goals. The preventive goal is 
more likely to show the positive effect of corporate financialization on EVA. The preventive goal is 
related to financial assets allocation through financialization to cope with potential problems such 
as insufficient liquidity in the future. Holding financial assets can help corporations reduce the high 
adjustment costs, thereby smoothing physical investment and R&D innovation activities (Stulz, 1984; 
Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Almeida et al., 2004; Brown & Petersen, 2011; Liu, 2017). 
Almeida et al. (2004) found that corporations will also prefer to “hold cash and move” when they 
may face macroeconomic uncertainties or potential investment opportunities in the future. Similarly, 
the preventive goal considers that necessary corporate financial asset investment can alleviate 
liquidity risks, promote the growth of corporate economic value added, and maintain the real 
economy. “Alternative” goal is a mode in which the corporate manager and corporate goals restrict 
their decision-making behavior. According to the resource allocation theory, an increase in the share 
of financial asset holdings indicates a decrease in the proportion of tangible assets (Tornell, 1990; 
Demir, 2009). Given the funds used for investment, the decision of a company to invest in financial 
assets and to invest in entities depends on how much profit can be made. Facing the investment yield 
gap, the continuous integration of financial resources will exacerbate the yield gap between real 
economy investment and productive investment, and weaken real economy investment. In other 
words, the “alternative” goal thinks that the goal of shareholder value maximization will lead 
companies to pay more attention to short-term interests, and crowd out the company’s industrial 
investment resources, and is not conducive to the increase of corporate economic value added. 
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Due to the dual goals of financialization, corporate financialization has a positive effect on EVA 
when corporate financialization is in a moderate range. However, too low a level of financialization is 
not conducive to alleviating the corporate liquidity risk and developing the real economy. When 
companies face favorable investment projects, increasing financial asset investment to obtain economic 
benefits can provide strong financial support for the real industry (Corpatauxet et al., 2009) and achieve 
a short-term increase in the corporate economic value added. It is a kind of capital reserve behavior for 
companies to allocate financial assets for fund management to obtain high financial returns, which is 
conducive to the corporate operation and sustainable development. However, excessive investment in 
financial assets will lead to insufficient industrial capital supply, increase the corporate business risk, and 
affect the long-term increase of the corporate economic value added. Excessive financialization driven 
by profit motive will also severely squeeze physical investment, and this squeezing effect will be 
enhanced with the increase of financialization (Zhang and Zhang, 2016; Hu et al., 2017). Moderate 
financialization can improve corporate profitability. Excessive financialization indicates a short-sighted 
investment tendency in the process of business operations. Lack of focus on the development of physical 
business is bound to hurt the long-term development of the company. 
Non-financial companies have a significant difference in the character of the industry capital 
intensiveness. There are also significant differences in preventive target needs. Thus, the moderate 
range of the positive effects is heterogeneous among industries. Industry characteristics lead to 
differences in the degree of corporate financialization. In other words, the same external economic 
environment has different effects on companies in different industries. Roy (2020) pointed out 
financialization is particularly unfavorable to the capital accumulation of companies dominated by the 
stock market by dividing companies into dominated by the stock market and other manufacturing 
industries. The level of industrial productivity will affect the preference of companies for production 
investment and finacial investment (Lei et al., 2020). When non-financial companies have a higher 
return on their main business in the industry, they will have more willingness to develop the main 
business, thereby reducing investment in finance. The different capital intensities of companies will 
lead to their different capital needs. The more capital-intensive industries need to invest more capital, 
the funds used for physical assets will be crowded out. Companies with high capital intensity have less 
incentive to hold financial assets.  
This study contributes to the extant literature in the following ways. First, this paper identifies 
corporate financialization has a significant impact on EVA. Although there are differences in the impact 
of corporate financialization on EVA, our analysis exploits the proportion of financial channel profit has 
a significant negative effect on EVA, that is, the higher the degree of corporate financialization, the lower 
the EVA. Second, the impact of corporate financialization on EVA is non-linear, and there is a threshold 
effect. The existing literature mainly focuses on whether the impact of corporate financialization on EVA 
is to promote or inhibit and lacks an in-depth study of the dynamic impact of this. Therefore, by 
examining the threshold effect of corporate financialization on EVA, this paper provides evidence that 
the impact of corporate financialization level on EVA has a moderate range. Third, the analysis highlights 
that, in particular, there is a heterogeneity in the impact of corporate financialization on EVA of factor 
intensity. By dividing companies into three categories namely labor-intensive, capital-intensive, and 
technology-intensive companies according to their factor intensity, this paper finds that the impact of 
corporate financialization on EVA is heterogeneous. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model and data. Section 3 
discusses the panel effect and threshold effect of corporate financialization impact on EVA. Section 4 
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presents the impact of corporate financialization on EVA has heterogeneity from the perspective of different 
factor intensity. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions and implications of this paper. 
2. Models construction and variables selection 
2.1. Hypotheses and models 
The starting point and endpoint of corporate economic behavior are to create and realize value. 
From the perspective of entity companies’ investment in financial assets, there are preventive and 
alternative motivations. Preventive motivation is that companies increase capital reserves by allocating 
financial assets to smooth their capital needs and maintain certain liquidity to cope with emergencies. 
If companies hold financial assets for preventive motivation, then financialization can ease the pressure 
of financial difficulties, solve the problem of insufficient investment in business operations, and 
promote the increase of corporate economic added value. The alternative motivation is that business 
operators invest a large number of funds into the financial market to obtain high returns from financial 
investments. If companies hold financial assets for alternative motivation, then financialization can 
inhibit the investment in business activities to some extent, hinder the improvement of operating 
efficiency, and thus restrict the corporate economic added value. Regardless of corporate 
financialization goals, financialization will have a significant impact on EVA. Besides, this paper also 
compares the measurement indicators of the level of corporate financialization. Based on this, we 
provide the following hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 1. Corporate financialization has a significant effect on EVA based on both FA and 
FC indicators. 
According to data availability, this paper uses panel data analysis to test the previous two 
indicators. The initial sample of this paper includes 913 China A-share listed companies from 2007 to 
2016. Panel regression models have been used as follows: 
1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it i t itEVA FC SIZE ROA Growth LEV u                   (1) 
1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it i t itEVA FA SIZE ROA Growth LEV u                   (2) 
In the models, the subscript i and t represent the firm and time respectively; FC represents the 
profit from the financial channel, FA expresses the proportion of financial assets, and we also include 
the following control variables, firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), Growth, and leverage ratio 
(LEV), we also control of industry fixed effect iu and time fixed effect t . 
The dual goal of corporate financialization makes the level of financialization has a positive effect 
on EVA with a moderate range. when non-financial companies use part of their idle funds to make 
short-term financial investments, they can improve the efficiency of the use of funds, activate funds, 
and achieve the purpose of capital preservation and appreciation. To some extent, this can prevent the 
shortage of funds for future main business investment, promote the development of the main business, 
and have a positive effect on the corporate economic added value. The operation of an entity company 
can be regarded as an “investment portfolio”. When the company makes profits through the main 
operating is weaker than through investment in financial assets, the company will increase the 
investment in financial assets and reduce the investment in the entity industry. From a short-term 
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perspective, the high returns of financial assets can achieve a short-term increase in the corporate 
economic added value. However, excessive investment in financial assets will cause companies to lack 
sufficient funds for equipment upgrades and product R&D innovations (Tori & Onaran, 2017). This 
will break away from the long-term competitive operations and lead to low operating efficiency, which 
often hurts corporate EVA. In short, moderate financialization can improve the operating conditions 
of companies. Excessive financialization will lead to insufficient fund supply in the entity industry, 
increase the operating risks, and affect the increase in the corporate economic added value. Based on 
this, we provide the following hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 2. The positive effect of corporate financialization on EVA is dynamic and there is a 
moderate range. 
The moderate interval reflects the threshold effect in the measurement method. So when studying 
the moderate range of the positive effect of financialization on EVA, we build a threshold panel data 
models. The main threshold models are as follows: 
   1 2it it it it itEVA FC I g FC I g          
1 2 3 4it it it it itSIZE ROA Growth LEV                (3) 
where itg is the threshold variable and is the threshold value. 
Given that there might be multiple thresholds for moderate intervals. Thus, we consider the 
existence of multiple thresholds, in further setting, we use a double threshold as follows: 
     1 1 2 1 2 3 2it it it it it it itEVA FC I g FC I g FC I g                
1 2 3 4it it it it itSIZE ROA Growth LEV               (4) 
2.2. Corporate financialization measurement and variables selection  
2.2.1. Corporate financialization measurement 
Existing literature mainly use two methods to measure corporate financialization. The first method 
is based on accounting subject which includes asset and profit accounts. According to this method, 
corporate financialization level can be obtained by comparing financial assets with firm total assets 
(Demir, 2009; Liu et al., 2014) to obtain financial assets proportion (FA). To measure financialization 
from a profit perspective, we can mainly examine the proportion of profit from financialization to obtain 
the proportion of profit from financial channels (FC). These measurements only differ in the caliber of 
financial assets. The second method is based on measuring the correlation between assets and liabilities 
(Shin & Zhao, 2013; Wang et al., 2015). Based on the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984), optimal 
capital structure is driven by companies’ preferences for different types of financing and companies will 
prefer lower-cost internal financing comparing with external financing. Therefore, financial assets and 
financial liabilities are moving in opposite directions. However, when a company borrows funds from a 
financial institution as a source of finance to engage in financial investment both financial liabilities and 
financial assets will rise and thus the correlation between them will be used to measure and identify 
corporate financialization. However, it is difficult to give specific measurement for the level of 
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financialization when measuring financialization based on assets-liabilities correlation. Therefore, the 
majority of previous literature use the first method to measure corporate financialization. 
Measuring the level of Financialization based on financial statements includes two channels that 
depend on two aspects: assets and profits. Corporate financialization measured by assets is the 
investment structure before the return is realized, which reflects the subjective wishes of companies. 
However, corporate financialization measured by profits is the investment structure after the return is 
realized, which includes market prices, risks, and other factors. Two different measurements of 
financialization can be obtained from those two channels. Previous literature has some differences in 
the caliber of the two indicators (Demir, 2009; Xie et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014). The two indicators 
which used in this paper are summarized and the data processing methods are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Comparison of financialization level indicators. 
Index Calculation method Molecular caliber Denominator caliber 
or special treatment 
Proportion of financial 
assets (FA) 
Financial assets/total assets Sum of monetary funds, 
trading financial assets, 
available-for-sale financial 
assets, long-term equity 
investment and real estate 
investment. 
Total assets 
Proportion of financial 
channels profit (FC) 
Profit from financial channels 
Minus operating 
profit/|𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡| 
Investment income, profit 
and loss from changes in 
fair value and other 
comprehensive income and 
other financial channels 
minus investment income 
from associates and joint 
ventures 
When the company 
does not make profits 
through financial 
channels, the value is 
−1. 
The value is greater 
than −1 means that the 
company makes 
profits through 
investment in 
financial assets. Less 
than −1 indicates that 
the company has loss 
through investment in 
financial assets 
It should be noted that when the corporate financialization is measured from the perspective of 
financial profit channels, as the operating profit is negative, this paper uses the absolute value of 
operating profit for standardization. The specific method is the profit from financial channels minus the 
main operating profit divided by the absolute value of the main operating profit. In other words, when 
the value of the proportion of financial channels profit is greater than −1, it means that the company can 
achieve profit by investing in financial assets, and when the value of the proportion of financial channels 
profit is less than −1, it means that the company losses by investing in financial assets. 
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2.2.2. Explained and control variables 
Economic value added (EVA) is a kind of residual income, which takes into account the cost of 
capital in the course of operations. According to the theory of EVA, the value of economic added value 
created by a corporate is the net operating profit after tax minus the total cost of capital. Considering the 
capital cost of equity, it is believed that only when the economic added value is greater than zero can a 
corporate truly obtain benefits. EVA can meet the needs of stakeholders, seek sustainable development 
strategies based on the corporate’s realization of its own interests, and ultimately achieve the purpose of 
corporate value maximization, shareholder maximization, and operator wealth maximization. 
There are many factors that affect EVA in model construction. According to relevant theories and 
the empirical studies of many scholars (Lin et al., 2010; Ehie & Olibe, 2010; Liu & Wang, 2017), other 
variables that affect EVA include corporate size and profitability, etc. When studying the impact of 
corporate financialization on EVA, it is necessary to assume that other influencing factors remain 
unchanged, that is, other main influencing factors need to be controlled and set as control variables in 
the measurement test. Based on systematically summarizing the relevant literature and combining the 
characteristics of Chinese listed companies, this paper selects four control variables, namely: 1) 
Corporate size (SIZE), is measure as the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 2) 
Profitability (ROA), is calculated as return on assets; 3) corporate growth(Growth), is defined as the 
annual growth rate of total assets; 4) Leverage (LEV), is calculated as total debt divided by total assets. 
2.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
The initial sample of this study employs all nonfinancial corporations listed on the A-share from 
China Security Market from 2007 to 2016. All financial data has been collected from the China Stock 
Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Database and sample selection are based on the 
following criteria. First, we exclude companies from financial, insurance, and real estate industries, as 
well as ST and PT. The reason for excluding financial, insurance, and real estate listed corporations is 
that the main business of such corporations is a financial industry or a quasi-financial industry, and the 
proportion of financial assets in total assets is significantly different from that of nonfinancial 
corporations. For ST and PT, these two types of corporations with continuous losses and insufficient 
sustained operating capacity, which do not have the characteristics of allocating financial assets. 
Second, we also exclude companies with a missing data rate of more than 50%. 
A total of 9130 firm-year observations were finally obtained after removing the outliers and 
missing values. After obtaining the sample data, we use the winsorize method to deal with continuous 
values among independent variables and dependent variables at the 1% levels to mitigate the effects 
of outliers. Descriptive statistics for key variables used in the study are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EVA 9,130 0.594 4.833 −14.170 29.445 
FA 9,130 0.248 0.164 0.020 0.791 
FC 9,130 −0.250 1.675 −2.264 10.270 
SIZE 9,130 9.539 0.542 8.299 11.022 
ROA 9,130 0.041 0.064 −0.180 0.261 
Growth 9,130 0.135 0.251 −0.347 1.342 
LEV 9,130 0.494 0.206 0.073 1.136 
Table 2 shows the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum 
value of each variable. The minimum value of EVA is −14.17, the maximum value is about 29.445, 
and the mean value is about 0.594. It indicates that the overall level of the corporate economic added 
value is not high. In the aspect of corporate financialization, the mean value of financial assets (FA) is 
about 0.248, the minimum is 0.02, and the maximum is 0.791. It means that the proportion of financial 
assets of different non-financial companies are quite different and the level of financialization of some 
companies is higher. It also means that financial assets have an important position in the company’s 
total assets, and financial asset investment has become the main content of the investment activities in 
most entities companies. The mean of financial channel profit (FC) is about −0.25, the minimum is 
about −2.264, and the maximum is 10.27. However, according to the previous explanation and the 
corresponding indicator processing process, the mean value greater than −1 indicates that the 
contribution of financial channel profits to corporate value is positive. This shows that on the whole, 
companies can make profits through financial investment. 
To examine the impact of corporate financialization on EVA, it is necessary to observe the 
correlation of various variables to avoid the problem of multicollinearity.  
Table 3. Correlation matrix. 
 EVA FA FC SIZE ROA Growth LEV 
EVA 1.000       
FA 0.098 1.000      
FC −0.182 0.038 1.000     
SIZE 0.230 −0.112 −0.077 1.000    
ROA 0.460 0.214 −0.316 0.042 1.000   
Growth 0.137 0.088 −0.136 0.107 0.283 1.000  
LEV −0.101 −0.329 0.153 0.245 −0.360 −0.054 1.000 
Table 3 presents a correlation matrix of the variables. The results show that the explained variable, 
corporate economic value added (EVA), is positively correlated with FA (0.098), SIZE (0.230), ROA 
(0.460), Growth (0.137), respectively, indicating that proportion of financial assets, corporate size, 
profitability, and corporate growth are positively associated with EVA. On the other hand, EVA is 
negatively correlated with FC (−0.182) and LEV (−0.101). This indicates that proportion of profit from 
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financial channels and corporate leverage may have a negative impact on corporate economic value 
added. Besides, none of the correlations among independent variables are high enough to cause 
concern, and the analysis of variance inflation factors associated with our regressions do not suggest 
that multicollinearity is a concern. 
3. Empirical results  
3.1. Regression results for the panel model 
Based on the Hypothesis 1 that corporate financialization has a significant effect on EVA, this 
paper conducts an empirical test on the different indicators of financialization lever obtained from the 
two channels of assets and financial profit, and selects an appropriate financialization level 
measurement indicator based on the empirical results. According to the set test model and sample data, 
the parameters of models (1) and (2) are respectively estimated, and the parameter estimation results 
are shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. The impact of corporate financialization on EVA. 
Variable Profits from financial channels Variable Financial assets divided by total assets
FE 
Model (1) 
RE 
Model (2) 
FE 
Model (3) 
RE 
Model (4) 
FC −0.059* 
(0.033) 
−0.064** 
(0.032) 
FA 0.477 
(0.588) 
0.834 
(0.508) 
SIZE 1.018*** 
(0.387) 
1.568*** 
(0.284) 
 1.081*** 
(0.390) 
1.621*** 
(0.287) 
ROA 29.583*** 
(2.177) 
30.794*** 
(2.106) 
 29.827*** 
(2.165) 
31.025*** 
(2.088) 
Growth 0.116 
(0.230) 
−0.049 
(0.233) 
 0.092 
(0.237) 
−0.082*** 
(0.238) 
LEV 0.487 
(0.533) 
0.364 
(0.418) 
 0.524 
(0.552) 
0.481 
(0.444) 
Cons. −10.714*** 
(3.617) 
−16.071*** 
(2.635) 
 −11.421*** 
(3.677) 
−16.843*** 
(2.721) 
Industry effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Time-effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Obs 9130 9130  9130 9130 
R2 0.176 0.175  0.175 0.175 
Note: FE and RE represent fixed effect and random effect respectively; GLS; robust standard error in parentheses; *, **, 
and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Financial channel profit refers to the composition of the source of corporate profits, which reflects 
the proportion of profits earned that companies invest in financial assets. It is a structured indicator of 
flow nature, which is more likely to show corporate speculative behavior. The profitability of 
companies through financial investment is more of a capital-seeking behavior for profit maximization. 
Financial assets refer to the distribution of assets of a company, reflecting the share of financial assets 
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in the total assets of a company. It is a structural indicator of stock nature, and more shows the saving 
motive of a company. Holding financial assets more describes the resource reserve behavior of 
companies for sustainable development. From the results of parameter estimation in Table 4, the 
coefficient of the financial channel profit (FC) is −0.059 (P < 0.1), and the coefficient of the financial 
asset is 0.477. This paper also provides the estimation results of the random-effects model to support 
it. It can be seen from regression results that both of fixed-effect model or a random-effect model show 
that the regression coefficient of the proportion of financial channel profits has passed the significance 
level of 10%, and both harm EVA. The regression coefficients of the proportion of financial assets all 
show a positive effect on EVA. The empirical results confirm that financial assets play a “reservoir” 
role, and financial channel profits are more of a “substitute” role. Based on the mechanism of financial 
channel profit and financial assets, combined with Hypothesis1, comparing the two indicators, it can 
be considered that financial channel profit (FC) is an effective indicator to measure the level of 
financialization. The higher the proportion of financial channel profits, the less the economic added 
value of the corporate will be. 
3.2. Regression results for the threshold effect model 
3.2.1. Threshold effect test 
As mentioned earlier in section 3.1, empirical results show that financial channel profit (FC) is 
an effective measurement for the level of financialization. Therefore, the next step is a further 
investigation to determine which of Model 1 or Model 2 should be used. The Husman test was used 
and we found that the fixed-effects model is more appropriate than the random-effects model (P-value 
equals 0.0000). Therefore, a two-way fixed effect model is used for the estimation. Model 1 results are 
reported in Table 4. Before looking for the moderate threshold, it is necessary to test whether there is 
a threshold effect and whether it is a single threshold or multiple thresholds. Then, we use the Bootstrap 
method of Hansen (1996, 2000) to obtain the P-value of this test in order to determine whether there 
is a threshold effect or not. The results of the self-sampling inspection are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 shows that both of the single-threshold effect and the double-threshold effect are significant 
at 1% but the three-threshold effect is not significant. Combined with the goal of financialization. An 
appropriate interval of corporate financialization level leads to the optimal allocation of firm financial 
resources. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a nonlinear double-threshold effect of corporate 
financialization on EVA. 
Table 5. Threshold self-sampling test. 
Threshold model F-statistics P-value 10% 5% 1% 
Single 55.84*** 0.000 9.334 11.887 14.419 
Double 87.17*** 0.000 14.385 19.693 19.693 
Triple 8.92 0.437 17.809 21.237 27.500 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; both p-value and the critical value are 
obtained from the results after 300 times of simulation using the Bootstrap method. 
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3.2.2. The moderate range of the impact of financialization on EVA 
Parameters estimation of the double threshold model is reported in Table 6. 
Table 6. Threshold estimation results. 
Threshold Estimated value 95% confidence interval 
First −1.0885 [−1.2524, −1.0598] 
Second 1.5225 [1.2792, 1.8778] 
Table 6 shows the first and second thresholds estimations and their 95% confidence intervals for 
financialization level. Results in Table 6 show points’ values estimates for first and second thresholds 
which are −1.0885 and 1.5225 respectively. In addition, interval estimates for each threshold are 
presented at a 95% confidence level. The first threshold estimations are in the [−1.2524, −1.0598] 
interval and the second threshold estimations are in the [1.2792, 1.8778] interval.  
Further, we use a fixed-effect double threshold model in order to further investigate the impact of 
financialization on EVA in the intervals formed by different thresholds and based on the obtained 
thresholds. Parameter estimation results are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Regression results for threshold effect model. 
EVA coefficient Standard deviation T statistics P-value 
SIZE 1.2700 0.1470 8.64 0.000 
ROA 26.0294 0.8526 30.53 0.000 
Growth −0.1480 0.1612 −0.92 0.358 
LEV 0.4669 0.3396 1.38 0.169 
FC<−1.0885 0.5763 0.1128 5.11 0.000 
−1.0885<FC<1.5225 −0.6639 0.0677 −9.81 0.000 
FC>1.5225 −0.0030 0.0287 −0.11 0.916 
Cons. −13.0562 1.4088 −9.27 0.000 
Tables 7 shows that the effect of corporate financialization on EVA varies significantly at different 
levels. When financialization level is less than −1.0885, corporate financialization has a significant 
positive impact on EVA, with a coefficient of 0.5763. However, when the level of financialization is 
between [−1.0885 −1.5225], corporate financialization has a significant negative impact on EVA, with 
a coefficient of −0.6639. Also, when the level of financialization is more than 1.5225, corporate 
financialization has a negative impact on EVA but it is not significant. 
The influence of threshold parameter estimation results was obtained from including the entire 
sample. According to the empirical results, the level of financialization has a significant positive effect 
on EVA when the financial channel profit is less than a certain level. One reason for this would be that 
the goal of non-financial companies’ financing is to focus on the company’s main business. In the 
process of optimal financial allocation, certain financial assets need to be allocated due to liquidity 
requirements. These financial assets can obtain certain financial profits through financial management 
and other methods but these profits should only cover the cost of financing. Therefore, when the 
financial channel profits are at a negative value which is less than the threshold, the level of 
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financialization has a positive effect on EVA. When the financial channel profit is in the range of 
[−0.6639, 1.5225]. This indicates that non-financial companies tend to use financing funds for financial 
investment, and the investment goal is to achieve more investment income. At this level, the goal of 
the company is to pursue the maximum profit and ignores the company’s long-term development goals. 
Thus, financial channel profit has a negative effect on EVA. However, when the financial channel 
profit exceeds the threshold of 1.5225, non-financial companies are more inclined to profit from the 
financial channel to increase their financial income and thus, somehow will deviate business direction. 
This effect is negative but not significant which indicates that the essential attributes of the sample 
type have changed. 
4. The heterogeneity of the impact of corporate financialization on EVA 
4.1. The impact of industry classification differences on corporate financialization level 
One important objective of the financialization goals is to achieve optimal capital allocation but 
due to the huge differences in the use of funds by different industries, for example, labor-intensive 
industries such as construction require relatively few liquid funds and relatively thus it has weak 
sensitivity to funds. Thus, when labor-intensive industries demand liquidity, they can often solve part 
of the problem by communicating with upstream and downstream. Capital-intensive industries such 
as electric power and heating require more liquid funds than labor-intensive industries. Moreover, the 
liquidity of the funds is strong and the greater allocation of capital to finance lies in optimizing capital 
allocation. Technology-intensive industries as electronic devices require large amounts of funds for 
R&D and innovation and the need for liquidity is highly correlated with R&D progress.  
Thus, financialization in these industries has to be combined with specific implementation 
projects, and the liquidity demand changes relatively large. Based on this, non-financial firms have a 
significant difference in the concentration of production factors. There are also significant differences 
in the allocation of funds, which in turn makes this different from the heterogeneity of the impact of 
corporate financialization in different industries. Therefore, based on the further classification method 
of non-financial corporates by Lu and Dang (2014), combined with the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, industry classification of the national economy, and classification of factor density, this 
paper divides the sample according to the standards of different industrial inputs and dominant factors. 
According to the relative intensity of the three production factors of labor, technology, and capital in 
each industry, they are divided into labor-intensive, capital-intensive, and technology-intensive. Labor-
intensive industries use labor as the main production structure and have a relatively low dependence 
on technology and equipment. They generally refer to industries such as agriculture, forestry, textile, 
and other industries. Technology-intensive industries are high-tech industries with a high demand for 
technical knowledge, and R&D expenditures are much higher than employee salaries. They usually 
include the electronics industry, the modern pharmaceutical industry, the information technology 
industry, and so on. Capital-intensive industries rely on capital, and the proportion of fixed assets in 
production factors is relatively large, which mainly refers to the transportation equipment 
manufacturing industry and the electric power industry. This classification is shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Factor intensity classification results. 
Labor-intensive Capital-intensive Technology-intensive 
A (agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, 
fishery), B (mining industry), C0 (food, 
beverage), 
C1 (textile, clothing, fur), C2 (wood, 
furniture), C9 (Other manufacturing), E 
(construction industry), F (wholesale and 
retail), 
H (Accommodation and Catering), 
L (leasing and business services), 
N (water conservancy, environment and 
public facilities management), P 
(education), 
Q (health and social work), R (culture, 
sports and entertainment), S(synthesize) 
C3 (paper, printing, culture 
and education), C4 
(petroleum, chemical, 
plastics and plastics), C6 
(non-metal, metal), D 
(electricity, heat, gas and 
water production and 
supply), G (transportation, 
storage and post industry) 
C5 (electronics), C7 
(machinery, equipment, 
instrumentation), C8 
(medicine, biological 
products), M (scientific 
research and technical service 
industry), I (information 
transmission, software and 
information technology 
industry) 
4.2. Threshold estimates by industry classification 
Table 8 shows sample classification by industry. Industry classification results have been taken 
as sub-samples and we also use the threshold effect model from the previous empirical test to study 
the impact of corporate financialization on EVA. The threshold test was performed and we find that 
each sub-sample has passed the double threshold test and the threshold value was estimated by the 
model. The results are reported in Table 9. 
Table 9. Results of threshold estimates by industry classification. 
Industry Threshold Estimated value 95% confidence interval 
Labor-intensive First −1.0857 [−1.1918, −1.0549] 
Second 2.4935 [1.4974, 3.0997] 
Capital-intensive First −1.5754 [−2.3593, −1.2585] 
Second 1.9979 [1.3752, 2.4445] 
Technology-intensive First −1.1094 [−1.3200, −1.0735] 
Second 1.1283 [0.1881, 1.2588] 
From the full sample and the subsample, the impact of financialization level on EVA shows a 
significant change at the first threshold. Therefore, we focus on analyzing the interval formed by the first 
threshold and the second threshold in Table 9 and analyze the heterogeneity of the impact of different 
industries through the overlap of this interval. The overlapping interval between labor-intensive industries 
and capital-intensive industries is [−1.0857, 1.9979], and the total interval length is [−1.5754, 2.4935]. 
Thus, the interval overlap ratio can be calculated and it is 60.83%. In the same way, the interval overlap 
ratio between labor−intensive industries and technology-intensive industries is 61.45%. The technology-
intensive industries are formed by a subset of the capital-intensive industries and the overlapping interval 
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ratio is 61.12%. Based on this, we can say that industries with different levels of factor density have 
significant differences in thresholds. Specifically, capital-intensive and technology-intensive require 
higher capital and more liquidity while labor-intensive industries require relatively low liquidity in capital 
allocation. Comparing technology-intensive and capital-intensive, the technology-intensive allocation of 
funds for R&D and other activities is relatively high but the R&D and innovation funding allocation cycle 
is relatively long. Therefore, the range of the corresponding threshold is narrower and thus non-financial 
companies are easier to operate in terms of capital allocation. 
4.3. Regression results for the threshold effect model by industry classification  
We use the threshold effect model to study the impact of corporate financialization on EVA 
parameter estimation by industry. Parameter estimation results are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10. Regression results for threshold estimations by industry. 
Threshold interval Labor-intensive Capital-intensive Technology-intensive 
1 0.5336*** 0.9010** 0.7962*** 
2 −0.3249*** −1.5497*** −0.3845*** 
3 −0.00285 0.0322 0.0010 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2900 2820 3410 
R2 0.2167 0.1655 0.2119 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
We call the interval formed by financialization level that is less than the first threshold value by 
the first interval and use “1” to represent it. The interval that is greater than the first threshold and less 
than the second threshold is called the second interval and represents by “2”. The interval that is greater 
than the second threshold is called the third interval and represents by “3”. 
As can be seen from Table 10, the results of interval 3 are not significant thus we focus on the 
results of interval 1 and interval 2. The results of interval 1 and interval 2 are totally opposite in the 
direction. The main reason is exactly the same as that of the full sample. For interval 1, in the three 
different industries, financialization has a significant positive impact on EVA. This impact varies from 
high to low impact and industries can be arranged according to their effect as a capital-intensive 
industry, technology-intensive industry, and labor-intensive industry with coefficients of 0.9010, 
0.7962 and 0.5336 respectively. In the second interval, the financialization of capital-intensive 
companies has a much stronger negative impact on EVA compared with labor-intensive and 
technology-intensive companies. In addition to this, capital-intensive companies have higher 
requirements for the fixed capital and working capital of each worker compared with labor-intensive 
and technology-intensive companies. If a company invests too much in finance and real estate which 
causing a lack of sufficient funds to carry out the physical investing which will inhibit the development 
of the main business of non-financial companies. This will also significantly reduce the profitability 
of the company. 
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5. Conclusion 
The paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate financialization on EVA through panel 
models and threshold effect models over the period 2007–2016 for Chinese A-share listed companies. 
First of all, the results show that corporate financialization has a significant impact on EVA. Through 
the empirical study of the fixed-effect model and random-effect model, this study found that the 
proportion of financial channel profit has a significant negative effect on EVA, that is, the higher the 
degree of corporate financialization, the lower the EVA. Such short-term profit-making behavior 
changes the corporate investment preferences, inhibits the growth of economic value added, and is not 
conducive to sustainable development. Secondly, the impact of corporate financialization on EVA is 
non-linear, and there may have both positive and negative effects. When the level of financialization 
is less than −1.0885, its coefficient is 0.5763 and the impact of corporate financialization on EVA is 
significantly promoted. However, when the level of financialization is in the range of [−0.6639, 
1.5225], its coefficient is −0.6639 which means corporate financialization has an inhibitory effect on 
EVA. Moreover, we found that under the circumstances that the profitability of financial channels 
tends to cope with liquidity allocation, financialization has a positive effect on EVA. Non-financial 
companies hold financial assets and make profits through financial management and other methods 
but the profit of such financial channel only make up the cost of financing and respond to liquidity 
needs. The main purpose is to achieve optimal financial allocation on the company’s main business 
and the impact of corporate financialization on EVA is positive. Furthermore, the results show that the 
impact of corporate financialization on EVA is heterogeneous among industries with factor intensity 
differences. Financializationin level in interval 1, the degree of the positive impact of financialization 
on EVA gradually decreased for capital-intensive, technology-intensive, and labor-intensive 
companies. Financialization level in interval 2, the financialization of capital-intensive companies has 
a stronger negative impact on EVA than technology-intensive and labor-intensive companies. 
Combined with the estimation of the whole sample, the conclusion has certain policy implications. 
The financialization of Chinese listed companies reduces EVA. The results of this study are of interest 
to investors and managers in that they improve our understanding of the corporate financialization 
affects the economic value added. On the one hand, it is necessary to regulate the financial asset 
allocation behaviors of corporates to guide long-term sustainable development. On the other hand, it 
is necessary to narrow the gap between the profits of financial channels and the real economy, and 
further promote financial services to the real economy. The results show that corporate financial 
management can be adjusted and supervised according to the moderate range and direction. This study 
also suggests that corporates can use liquid funds for financial business in the course of operation, but 
the primary goal is to meet the liquidity demand. By concentrating on the main business, we can avoid 
the deindustrialization and industrial hollowing caused by excessive financialization. The findings also 
highlight the differentiation strategies of different corporates. Based on the financialization caused by 
the different industry classification, the government should combine the industry characteristics to 
formulate differentiated support policies. 
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